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The Bayesian approach to the psychology of reasoning generalizes binary logic, extending
the binary concept of consistency to that of coherence, and allowing the study of deductive
reasoning from uncertain premises. Studies in judgment and decision making have found
that people’s probability judgments can fail to be coherent. We investigated people’s
coherence further for judgments about conjunctions, disjunctions and conditionals, and
asked whether their coherence would increase when they were given the explicit task
of drawing inferences. Participants gave confidence judgments about a list of separate
statements (the statements group) or the statements grouped as explicit inferences
(the inferences group). Their responses were generally coherent at above chance levels
for all the inferences investigated, regardless of the presence of an explicit inference
task. An exception was that they were incoherent in the context known to cause the
conjunction fallacy, and remained so even when they were given an explicit inference.
The participants were coherent under the assumption that they interpreted the natural
language conditional as it is represented in Bayesian accounts of conditional reasoning,
but they were incoherent under the assumption that they interpreted the natural language
conditional as the material conditional of elementary binary logic. Our results provide
further support for the descriptive adequacy of Bayesian reasoning principles in the study
of deduction under uncertainty.
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INTRODUCTION
Most everyday and scientific inferences are from uncertain
premises, with the aim of forming and revising beliefs and making
decisions. For example, some hypotheses about global warming
are more highly confirmed than others, but all are uncertain
to some degree, and yet there have to be inferences from these
hypotheses to further scientific research and practical decision
making. Given the ubiquity of reasoning under uncertainty, an
important question in the psychology of reasoning is how good
people are at it, and what can improve it when it falls short of the
appropriate normative theory.
Tversky and Kahneman (1983) pointed out that “. . .the nor-
mative theory of judgment under uncertainty has treated the
coherence of belief as the touchstone of human rationality.”
Coherence is the normative foundation of the Bayesian approach
to the study of cognition (Chater and Oaksford, 2008), which
is having an immense impact on the psychology of reasoning
(Elqayam and Over, 2013). To be coherent is to conform to the
axioms of probability theory, which are justified by the Dutch
book theorem (de Finetti, 1974).
There are tasks and contexts in which there appears to be
a remarkably good correspondence between people’s probability
judgments and probability theory (Griffiths and Tenenbaum,
2006; Oaksford and Hahn, 2007; Fiser et al., 2010; Oaksford and
Chater, 2013). But there are also contexts in which people are
incoherent. Until very recently, there were only limited studies
of whether people are coherent in their judgments about the
basic logical connectives of conjunction, disjunction, and the
conditional. Of course, there have been innumerable papers on
the conjunction fallacy (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983): judging
that the probability of a conjunction, P(p and q), is greater than
the probability of one of its conjunctions, P(p). The valid logical
inference related to this fallacy is and-elimination: inferring p from
p and q. But this is just one out of many logical inferences in
which conjunction occurs. There have been relatively few studies
of the disjunction fallacy (Bar-Hillel and Neter, 1993): judging
that P(p) is greater than P(p or q). The valid inference for this
fallacy is or-introduction: inferring p or q from p. There should be
wider studies of probability judgments about conjunctions and
disjunctions, especially when these connectives are related to the
conditional, if p then q, since conditionals are at the heart of so
much reasoning in both everyday affairs and science.
The purpose of this paper is to extend the study of whether
people’s probability judgments about conjunctions, disjunctions,
and conditionals are coherent. Our approach is that of the new
paradigm in the psychology of deductive reasoning, which goes
beyond the binary distinction between categorical belief in the
truth, or falsity, of propositions to the full range of degrees of
belief, or subjective probabilities (Evans and Over, 2004, 2013;
Oaksford and Chater, 2007, 2012, 2013; Pfeifer and Kleiter, 2010,
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2011; Baratgin et al., 2013; Pfeifer, 2013; Over, in press). The
probabilistic approach has taken two important steps in the study
of deduction: (1) it represents uncertainty in the premises and
conclusions of inferences, and (2) it represents the probability
of the natural language indicative conditional, P(if p then q), as
the conditional probability of q given p, P(q|p). The relation, P(if
p then q) = P(q|p), is so fundamental for a Bayesian account of
conditional reasoning that it has simply been called the Equation
(Edgington, 1995; Oaksford and Chater, 2007). A conditional that
satisfies the Equation has been called the probability conditional
(Adams, 1998; Oaksford and Chater, 2007), but we call it here
the conditional event (following de Finetti, 1995). The conditional
probability in the Equation, P(q|p), is not defined by the ratio
P(p and q)/P(p) in our approach (see also Pfeifer, 2014). One can
easily think of cases in which people have a clear degree of belief
about P(q|p) even though they judge that P(p)= 0, or they cannot
make a judgment at all about P(p) (Adams, 1998). We rather argue
that people infer the conditional probability in a Ramsey test, that
is, a mental simulation in which they hypothetically suppose p to
be the case, make whatever changes to their beliefs are necessary
to preserve consistency, and assess the probability of q on this
basis (Stalnaker, 1968; Ramsey, 1994; Evans and Over, 2004).
Both (1) and (2) have received strong and converging empirical
support (Oaksford et al., 2000; Evans et al., 2003; Oberauer and
Wilhelm, 2003; Oberauer et al., 2007; Over et al., 2007; Douven
and Verbrugge, 2010; Politzer et al., 2010; Fugard et al., 2011b;
Baratgin et al., 2014; Cruz and Oberauer, 2014; Singmann et al.,
2014).
In an influential alternative approach, mental model theory,
the natural language indicative conditional is taken to have the
same full models as the material conditional of elementary exten-
sional logic, which is logically equivalent to not-p or q. The
material conditional is truth functional, that is, its truth or falsity
is a function of the truth or falsity of its elementary components,
the propositions p and q. It is false when its antecedent p is true
and the consequent q is false, and it is true in the other three
possible cases (that is, the cases p and q, not-p and q, and not-p
and not-q). In mental model theory, P(if p then q)= P(not-p or q)
is supposedly the correct normative probability judgment to make
(Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991, 2002; Byrne and Johnson-Laird,
2009, 2010). Whether P(if p then q) equals P(q|p) or P(not-p or q)
very much affects which judgments are coherent in conditional
reasoning, as we will see below.
Consider the uncertain premises and possible uncertain con-
clusions that form the basis of most of our ordinary and scientific
reasoning. The axioms of probability theory can be used to deter-
mine whether combinations of these premises and conclusions
are, or are not, coherent (for recent examples see Pfeifer and
Kleiter, 2005, 2009; Gilio and Over, 2012). For instance, there
are the valid inferences of and-elimination, referred to above,
and also and-introduction: inferring p and q from the separate
premises p and q. For probability judgments about p, q, and
p and q to be coherent, P(p and q) must lie in the interval
between P(p) + P(q) − 1 (or 0 if this sum is negative) at the
lower end, and the minimum of P(p) and P(q) at the upper end
(Pfeifer and Kleiter, 2005). For example, P(p) = P(q) = 0.6 and
P(p and q) = 0.1 is incoherent because P(p and q) is too low, and
P(p)= P(q)= 0.6 and P(p and q)= 0.7 is incoherent, and the con-
junction fallacy is committed, because now P(p and q) is too high.
Our question in this paper is whether people are generally coher-
ent in their conjunctive, disjunctive, and conditional premises and
conclusions, and whether their coherence is improved when they
are given explicit inferences. Tversky and Kahneman (1983) did
not ask their participants to infer degrees of confidence in the
conclusion p from an uncertain p and q premise in an explicit
inference, but we did ask participants in our experiments.
Studies of the coherence between premises and conclusions of
people’s reasoning has only just begun (Pfeifer and Kleiter, 2005,
2010, 2011; Pfeifer, 2013; Politzer and Baratgin, under review;
Singmann et al., 2014; Evans and Over, under review). There
is evidence, for example, that people are coherent in explicit
and-introduction inferences (Pfeifer and Kleiter, 2005; Politzer
and Baratgin, under review). There are also some studies of the
classical conditional inferences of modus ponens (MP), modus
tollens (MT), affirmation of the consequent (AC), and denial
of the antecedent (DA), and it has been found that the degree
to which people are coherent can increase when they are given
some of these conditional inferences as explicit tasks to perform
(Evans and Over, under review; see also Pfeifer and Kleiter, 2010;
Singmann et al., 2014).
We conducted two experiments focusing on conjunctions,
disjunctions, and their relationships with conditionals, and com-
paring probability judgments about the premises and conclusions
when these were given as separate statements and when they were
arranged as explicit inferences. Experiment 1 looked at inferences
between disjunctions and conditionals, and Experiment 2 at infer-
ences between conjunctions and conditionals. The inferences are
summarized in Table 1.
Inferences 1.1 and 1.2 are logically equivalent, as are inferences
1.3 and 1.4, as well as inferences 1.5 and 1.6. They differ only in
the position of the negation they contain. The two positions of
the negation instantiated in the inferences are those for which
the largest negation effects have been reported in the literature
(Oberauer et al., 2011; Espino and Byrne, 2013). We introduced
this variation in order to control for negation effects. Experiment
1 assessed two further inferences, and Experiment 2 six further
inferences, which are not listed in Table 1. These additional
inferences were used to investigate other questions, and are not
discussed here further.
Inferences 1.1 and 1.2 are logically equivalent forms of or-
introduction, and here it is clearly incoherent to judge that the
probability of the conclusion is lower than that of the premise. It is
a consequence of the axioms of probability theory that P(p)≤ P(p
or q). In the binary approach, it is inconsistent to assume the
Table 1 | The inferences used in Experiments 1 and 2.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
1.1 p, therefore p or q 2.1 p & q, therefore if p then q
1.2 not-p, therefore not-p or q 2.2 p, q, therefore if p then q
1.3 If p then q, therefore not-p or q 2.3 p & q, therefore p
1.4 if not-p then q, therefore p or q 2.4 p & q, therefore q
1.5 p or q, therefore if not-p then q
1.6 not-p or q, therefore if p then q
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truth of the premise of or-introduction, p, but not to accept that
p or q follows. Binary studies found that people did endorse this
inference at just above chance levels, but also that there was sig-
nificant resistance to it (Rips, 1983, 1994; Braine et al., 1984). This
finding has generally been explained as a pragmatic effect: people
are unwilling to draw the inference because it would be misleading
in a conversation with another person to endorse p or q when one
can make the more informative statement p (Grice, 1989; see also
Bar-Hillel and Neter, 1993; Tversky and Koehler, 1994; Fugard
et al., 2011a). The much wider Bayesian approach can cover the
special case of binary inconsistency by letting a probability of 1
represent “true” and a probability 0 represent “false.” The binary
findings could be said to reveal implicit incoherent reasoning
because people are, in effect, making P(p) = 1, p is “true,” and
P(p or q) = 0, p or q is “false.” However, we predicted greater
coherence when people are explicitly asked for their degrees of
belief about p and p or q. People can then state their degrees of
belief directly, without needing to consider additional pragmatic
factors that arise when communicating with another speaker. This
should lead to the prevention, or at least to a strong reduction, of
pragmatic effects.
Inferences 1.3 and 1.4 are logically equivalent if-to-or infer-
ences and go from a conditional to a disjunction. Supposing if
p then q is equivalent to the material conditional, P(if p then q) =
P(not-p or q), any other judgment is incoherent. Supposing if p
then q is the conditional event, P(if p then q) = P(q|p). It follows
from the axioms of probability theory that P(q|p)≤ P(not-p or q),
and probability judgments must conform to this relation to be
coherent.
Inferences 1.5 and 1.6 are logically equivalent or-to-if infer-
ences and go from a disjunction to a conditional. If the condi-
tional in these inferences is interpreted as the material condi-
tional, then the same equivalence holds as for 1.3 and 1.4, and
judgments are only coherent when the premise and conclusion
are assigned the same probability. If the conditional is interpreted
as the conditional event, then judgments are coherent when they
conform to the relation P(q|p) ≤ P(not-p or q). Thus the relation
that must hold for the inferences to be coherent is the same
for 1.3–1.4 and for 1.5–1.6. The difference is that in the first
two the conditional is the premise, and in the second two the
conditional is the conclusion. This implies that, if one interprets
the conditional as the conditional event, the if-to-or inference is
coherent when the probability of the conclusion is equal or higher
than that of the premise, whereas the or-to-if inference is coherent
when the probability of the conclusion is equal or lower than that
of the premise. This difference in the conditions for coherence of
the two inferences is reflected in the fact that under a conditional
event interpretation, the if-to-or inference is valid, whereas the or-
to-if inference is invalid and can even be a quite a weak inference.
When we speak of validity in this context of uncertain infer-
ence, we mean probabilistic validity, or p-validity. P-validity is a
generalization of binary validity to reasoning under uncertainty.
Just as an inference is binary valid when there are no cases in
which the conclusion is false and the premise is true, a single
premise inference is p-valid when there are no coherent cases
in which the probability of the conclusion is lower than the
probability of the premise (see Adams, 1998, on p-validity for
inferences with more than one premise; Singmann et al., 2014;
Evans and Over, under review, for applications in the psychology
of reasoning). For the or-to-if inference, such cases are possible.
Consider an instance of 1.5. We might have a high degree of
confidence that our bicycle is outside our apartment in Paris
where we left it. That should, if we are coherent in the or-
introduction inference, give us a high degree of confidence that
our bicycle is outside our apartment in Paris or in Timbuktu.
But we do not have any confidence that, if our bicycle is not
outside our apartment in Paris, then it is in Timbuktu. It is
much more reasonable to infer that, if our bike is not there, it
is somewhere else in Paris after being stolen. Johnson-Laird and
Byrne (2002, p. 650) claimed that people always endorse 1.5, but
Gilio and Over (2012) have an analysis of when 1.5 and 1.6 are,
and are not, reasonable inferences to make, and Over et al. (2010)
have supporting results. Because the question of whether people’s
responses to the or-to-if inferences are coherent depends on how
the conditional is interpreted, our investigation of these inferences
does more than reveal their coherence in general. It also tells
us about the modal interpretation of the conditional. If people’s
judgments are highly incoherent for one interpretation, and yet
highly coherent for another, there is an argument in favor of the
interpretation that renders their judgments coherent.
Inferences 2.1 and 2.2 are from a conjunction to the condi-
tional. The first has the conjunction as a single premise, whereas
the second has the two conjuncts as separate premises. It is
easiest to state what is coherent for the single premise inference
to the conditional event. By probability theory, P(p and q) =
P(p)P(q|p) ≤ P(q|p). The formula for the coherence of judgments
about the premises and conclusion of the 2.2 inference is more
complex because it requires taking into account that the premises
can covary to different degrees (Kleiter, 2014). The formula for
it is reported in Experiment 2 below. Because of this additional
complexity in processing coherence for inference 2.2, we wanted
to assess whether people’s responses complied with coherence
more often for 2.1 than for 2.2.
Inferences 2.3 and 2.4 are forms of and-elimination, and we
have already stated above how coherence is determined for them.
Not conforming to coherence for this inference is to commit
the conjunction fallacy. We therefore wanted to test for this case
whether our general prediction holds: that people’s probability
judgments more often conform to coherence when they are given
the explicit task of drawing inferences.
EXPERIMENT 1
METHODS
Participants
A total of 1140 participants from English speaking countries
completed the online experiment, in exchange fore0.1. From this
initial sample we excluded cases that had the same IP address as
a previously recorded participant, cases that provided the same
response on all trials, and cases that had a reported age below 12 or
above 1001. The final sample consisted of 871 participants. Their
1A reanalysis of the data excluding the 20 participants with a reported age
between 12 and 17 led to the same pattern of significant and non-significant
results.
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mean age was 35 years (range 12–78). They reported different
levels of formal educational training, and 87% reported having
“good” or “very good” English language skills.
Material and design
Participants were shown a short scenario describing a person,
and then presented with a series of statements about the person.
The statements either appeared one at a time on the screen,
in random order for each participant in the statements group,
or the statements were presented in pairs as the premises and
conclusions of explicit inferences in the inferences group. Partic-
ipants in the statements group were asked to judge how confident
they were in each statement, by typing in a percentage between
0% (“no confidence at all”) and 100% (“complete confidence”).
Participants in the inferences group were asked to judge how
confident they were in the premise of the argument, and then
how confident they were in the conclusion, given the premise.
Participants in the inferences group used the same percentage
scale as those in the statements group to provide their answers.
Two scenarios were varied between participants: The Linda
scenario (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983), with the standard
description of Linda, and a scenario describing a person conform-
ing to a stereotype quite unlike that of Linda. Below is a sample
trial in the statements group and in the inferences group, using
the Linda scenario:
Statements group:
Now consider the following statement about Linda:
Please indicate how much confidence you would have in this
statement. Please give a percentage rating from 0% (no confidence
at all) to 100% (complete confidence).
“Linda votes for the Labour Party or the Green Party”
Inferences group:
Now consider the following argument about Linda:
Next to A please indicate how much confidence you would
have in the premise of the argument. Next to B please indicate
how much confidence you would have in the conclusion, given the
premise. Please give a percentage rating from 0% (no confidence
at all) to 100% (complete confidence).
A. “Linda votes for the Labour Party or the Green Party”
B. “Therefore, if Linda does not vote for the Labour Party, then
she votes for the Green Party”
In the inferences group, participants judged each inference
twice with different contents. The allocation of scenario contents
to inferences was counterbalanced across participants, leading
to eight different booklets, four for each scenario. In the state-
ments group, each participant rated the entire set of contents
created for the relevant scenario, leading to two booklets, one
for each scenario. In order to compensate for the difference in
sample size between groups resulting from the different number
of booklets in each group, we placed a weight on the other-
wise random procedure for assigning participants to booklets,
such that participants were twice as likely to receive any one
of the booklets of the statements group than any one of the
booklets of the inferences group. This resulted in sample sizes of
n = 305 and n = 566 for the statements and inferences group,
respectively.
Procedure
The experiment took place online using the platform Crowd-
Flower. On the first screen participants viewed the instructions
and a sample trial. The next screen showed the scenario within
which the statements, or respectively the inferences, were to be
assessed. These then followed, presented one at a time on the
screen. A further screen asked for demographical information,
and a final screen provided debriefing information. The whole
procedure took on average 4.24 min for the statements group and
5.23 min for the inferences group.
RESULTS
We measured above chance compliance with coherence using a
method introduced by Evans et al. (under review; see also Pfeifer
and Kleiter, 2009). First, we computed the difference between
the probability assigned to the conclusion and the probability
assigned to the premise. We then computed a binary variable to
encode whether this difference indicated that the response was
coherent or not. Thus, for or-introduction, 1.1–1.2, and the if-
to-or inferences, 1.3–1.4, this variable took the value 1 when the
difference was positive or 0, and took the value 0 otherwise. For
the or-to-if inferences, 1.5–1.6, the variable took the value 1 when
the difference was 0 or negative, and took the value 0 otherwise.
This computation was performed separately for each participant
and inference. We call this variable observed coherence. Next, we
computed the probability of a response being coherent by chance,
chance coherence. On the assumption that a random response can
fall equally likely on any point of the probability scale, the prob-
ability of complying to coherence by chance corresponds to the
width of the coherence interval. This is a simplifying assumption
because there is evidence that people’s probability estimates might
be biased at the boundaries of the interval, in a way that could lead
to higher chance rates for extreme cases (c.f. Stewart et al., 2006).
However, we considered a uniform distribution of chance rates a
sufficiently accurate approximation to allow an assessment of the
hypotheses at hand. On this assumption, if a person assigns for
instance a probability of 0.6 to the premise of an or-introduction
inference, then the probability she assigns to the conclusion is
coherent if it falls within the interval between 0.6 and 1. Because
the width of this interval is 0.4, the chance rate of conforming to
coherence is in this case also 0.4. Finally, we subtracted chance
coherence from observed coherence, to obtain a measure of the
extent to which responses were coherent at levels above those
expected by chance, above chance coherence.
The ratings of above chance coherence were submitted to a
mixed ANOVA with the between subjects factor of task (state-
ments, inferences) and the within subjects factor of inference (or-
introduction, if-to-or, and or-to-if ). Throughout the paper, the
Greenhouse–Geisser correction of degrees of freedom for lack
of sphericity was used when appropriate, and the Bonferroni–
Holm correction of p-values for multiple comparisons was used to
define the limit of a significant effect, while reporting the original
p-values. The results are depicted in Figure 1. The overall inter-
cept was significant, F(1,869) = 885.29, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.505,
indicating that overall probability judgments were coherent at
above chance level. There was also a main effect of inference,
F(1.382,1201.390)= 266.28, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.235: above chance
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FIGURE 1 | Observed versus chance coherence for the six inferences of
Experiment 1, (A) for the statements and (B) for the inferences task.
Inferences 1 and 2 are logically equivalent or-introduction inferences, with a
negation absent in 1 and present in the premise of 2. Inferences 3 and 4 are
logically equivalent if-to-or inferences. Inference 3 has a negation in the
conclusion and inference 4 in the premise. Inferences 5 and 6 are logically
equivalent or-to-if inferences. Inference 5 has a negation in the conclusion
and inference 6 in the premise. See Table 1 for the precise logical form of
the inferences. Error bars show 95% CI.
coherence differed for the three inferences. No other effects were
significant (highest F = 1.07, lowest p= 0.30). In particular, there
was no significant effect of task.
Follow-up analyses of the effect of inference showed that
although responses were coherent at above chance level for all
three inferences, the degree of above chance coherence was higher
for or-to-if than for if-to-or, F(1,869) = 270.99, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.238; and higher for if-to-or than for or-introduction,
F(1,869)= 16.50, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.019. Thus, responses to both
or-to-if and if-to-or were consistently above chance. Responses to
or-introduction were also coherent more often than expected by
chance, although somewhat less often than responses to the other
two inferences. An inspection of Figure 1 suggests that the differ-
ence between the if-to-or and the or-introduction inferences was
due mainly to the lower coherence for or-to-if for inference 1.2 in
the statements task. In line with this, a comparison between the
two inferences restricted to the inference task showed no differ-
ence in above chance coherence between the two, F(1,565)= 1.85,
p= 0.17, η2p = 0.003.
We conducted a further analysis of the or-to-if inference in
which we excluded responses that are coherent for both the
conditional event and the material conditional interpretation of
the conditional: responses that assigned the same probability to
the premise and conclusion. We treated as coherent only those
responses that are coherent for a conditional event interpretation:
responses that assigned a lower probability to the conclusion
than to the premise. On a material conditional interpretation,
the only coherent response to this inference is to assign the same
probability to both the premise and conclusion, and assuming
that people interpret the conditional as the material conditional,
the mean difference between premise and conclusion probability
would be expected to be 0. There might be some scattering of
probabilities above and below 0, but no systematic drift in any
direction. We would expect there to be no effect of coherence for
this analysis. On a conditional event interpretation, responses are
coherent when the probability of the conclusion of the or-to-if
inference is equal to or lower than that of the premise. On this
interpretation, we would expect coherence to be lower for this
analysis than for the analysis using all the data, because a subset
of coherent responses would not be considered. The absence
of an effect of coherence would also be compatible with this
interpretation, and would then render the analysis uninformative
to the question at hand. However, a remaining effect of coherence
in the expected direction would constitute specific evidence for
a conditional event interpretation and against a material condi-
tional interpretation of the conditional.
An univariate ANOVA on above chance coherence for the or-
to-if inference, using only the data for which probability judg-
ments differed for premise and conclusion in each individual case,
yielded a significant intercept, F(1,362) = 100.27, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.217: responses to or-to-if were coherent at levels above
chance when only considering as coherent those responses that are
coherent for the conditional event and incoherent for the material
conditional interpretation of the conditional.
Although Figure 1 shows the results separately for each posi-
tion of the negation, we did not find any consistent effects
regarding this variable. We also did not have any hypotheses about
it, but introduced it only as a control variable, to be able to obtain
a pattern of results that could be generalized across positions of
the negation.
DISCUSSION
We investigated the extent to which people’s probability judg-
ments were coherent for the premises and conclusions of infer-
ences 1.1 to 1.6, when these were separate statements, in the
statements group, and when they were formed into explicit infer-
ences, in the inference group. We found people’s responses to be
coherent at levels above chance for the three inferences forms
investigated, 1.1–1.2, 1.3–1.4, and 1.5–16, in both the statements
group and the inferences group. There was therefore clear evi-
dence that people’s probability judgments conform to Bayesian
principles, and at the same time there was no evidence that
this conformity was improved further in the context of explicit
inference.
Responses for the or-introduction inferences, 1.1–1.2, were
found to be coherent at levels above chance, and to a degree
similar to that for the if-to-or inferences 1.3–1.4., implying that
participants endorse this inference when they are asked for their
degrees of belief and not whether, as in a binary experiment, the
conclusion necessarily follows given the premise. This finding is
in accordance with our prediction that pragmatic factors have
less effect on this inference when people are asked for their
degrees of belief. Also supporting this conclusion, (Politzer and
Baratgin, under review) found, using an ordinal response format
for degrees of belief, that responses for or-introduction were
coherent to a level comparable to five other valid inferences. But
they also found coherence rates for the inference to be lower
when the premise was certain than when it was uncertain. The
limiting case of certainty, which is in effect the only one studied
in a binary approach, may give a misleading picture of how
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far people conform to Bayesian standards, and this hypothe-
sis will have to be investigated further. One option would be
through a comparison of responses with binary and with contin-
uous response format. Although a mapping of the two response
scales is not straightforward, larger differences between them
would still be informative (see Markovits and Handley, 2005;
Singmann and Klauer, 2011, for two ways of carrying out such a
comparison).
The analysis of responses to the or-to-if inferences, 1.5–1.6,
showed that participants’ responses would fail to be coherent at
levels above chance under a material conditional interpretation
of the conditional, P(if p then q) = P(not-p or q), whereas they
would be coherent at levels above chance if the natural language
conditional is interpreted as the conditional event, P(if p then
q) = P(q|p). There does not appear to be any reason why people
would be so highly incoherent for these inferences if they had
a material conditional understanding of the natural language
conditional. But if they have a conditional event understanding,
our finding is to be expected, and it provides new support for
the conditional event interpretation of the conditional. People’s
conditional reasoning can be much “improved” from a Bayesian
point of view, if their understanding of the conditional is, to begin
with, correctly identified by the psychology of reasoning.
Responses to the if-to-or inferences were likewise reliably
coherent above chance levels, showing that participants respected
the difference in the coherence conditions between these and the
or-to-if inferences.
Experiment 1 investigated inferences between conditionals
and disjunctions. Our second experiment addresses inferences
between conditionals and conjunctions, and includes the content
that is famous for causing the incoherence of the conjunction
fallacy.
EXPERIMENT 2
METHOD
Participants
Forty-eight students from the University of Orsay, France, took
part in the experiment on a voluntary basis. Their mean age
was 20 years (range 18–24). They had different majors, although
the majority studied biology or medicine. All participants were
French native speakers.
Material and design
The material and design were very similar to those of Experi-
ment 1. However, only the Linda scenario was used, and because
the original inferences contained no negations, no negation effects
were assessed. Inferences 2.1 and 2.2, and-to-if forms, used con-
tents prototypical for the scenario, in order to obtain higher
probability estimates for the premises and thus lower probabilities
of conforming to coherence just by chance. Inferences 2.3 and
2.4, and-elimination inferences, varied the prototypicality of the
content for the scenario in the same way as in Tversky and Kahne-
man’s (1983) original work on the conjunction fallacy. To take an
example from the explicit inferences group, participants read the
standard description of Linda and were then asked to state what
confidence they had in “Linda is banker” as a conclusion explicitly
inferred from “Linda is a feminist and a banker” as a premise.
Participants were divided into two groups of equal size. The
booklets for the statements group contained a continuous list of
statements. In the booklets for the inferences group, each infer-
ence appeared on a separate page. Four booklets were constructed
for each group, which differed only in the order in which the items
were presented.
Procedure
Participants were tested in the university library in small groups
of up to four participants. They worked at their own pace, and
took 10 to 15 min to complete.
RESULTS
Responses to inference 2.1 are incoherent when the probability
assigned to the conclusion is lower than that of the premise. For
inference 2.2, the computation of coherence is more complicated
because it takes into account the minimum and maximum over-
lap between the two premises. The lower and upper coherence
bounds for this inference, when the entailed conditional is inter-
preted as the conditional event, are as follows:
P(conclusion) = P(q|p) ∈
[
max
{
0,
p+ q− 1
p
}
, min
{
q
p
, 1
}]
We only computed coherence for the conditional event inter-
pretation of the conditional. However, the coherence bounds
for this interpretation are stronger than those for the material
conditional. Therefore, any response that is coherent for the
above interpretation is also coherent for the material conditional
interpretation. See Politzer (2014) for a proposal of how to obtain
the intervals of coherence for a wide range of inferences in an
intuitive way using a water tank analogy.
The results are illustrated in Figure 2. To assess whether the
additional complexity of processing coherence for 2.2 as com-
pared to 2.1 leads to higher levels of above chance coherence for
2.1, we conducted a mixed ANOVA on above chance coherence
with the between subjects factor of task (statements, inferences)
FIGURE 2 | Observed versus chance coherence for the four inferences
of Experiment 2, (A) for the statements and (B) for the inferences task.
Inferences 1 and 2 are and-to-if inferences. The first has the conjunction p
and q as single premise, the second has p and q as two separate premises.
Inferences 3 and 4 are and-elimination inferences. The first has prototypical,
and the second counter-prototypical content for the scenario. See Table 1
for the precise logical form of the inferences. Error bars show 95% CI.
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and the within subjects factor of inference (2.1, 2.2). The intercept
was significant, F(1,46)= 36.83, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.445, indicating
that participants’ responses were coherent to a degree above that
expected by chance. No other effects were significant (largest
F = 1.03, lowest p = 0.32). In particular, there was no significant
effect of task or of inference.
To assess whether the conjunction fallacy is reduced in the
context of an inference task, a mixed ANOVA on above chance
coherence for inferences 2.3 and 2.4 was conducted, with task
as a between subjects factor and inference as a within subjects
factor. There was a main effect of inference, F(1,46) = 33.31,
p< 0.001, η2p= 0.420: The two inferences differed in above chance
coherence. No other effects were significant (largest F = 2.12,
smallest p= 0.15). In particular, the intercept was not significant,
indicating that overall the coherence of participants’ judgments
for these inferences did not differ from chance; and there was
no effect of task. In line with the pattern in Figure 2, follow
up analyses indicated that coherence was above chance for 2.3,
which used prototypical content, F(1,46) = 10.23, p = 0.002,
η2p = 0.182; and coherence was below chance for 2.4, which
used counter-prototypical content, F(1,46) = 18.37, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.285.
DISCUSSION
The finding of above chance coherence for the and-to-if infer-
ences 2.1 and 2.2 extends the evidence of Experiment 1 to
inferences relating conjunctions and conditionals. The absence
of an effect of inference implies that at least for the materi-
als used, the additional requirement in 2.2 of integrating two
premise probabilities did not reduce the coherence of people’s
responses. The absence of an effect of task suggests that above
chance coherence for this inference was also not affected by the
presence of an explicit inference task, similar to the findings from
Experiment 1. A further investigation of the extent to which the
requirement of integrating premise probabilities affects people’s
reasoning performance could vary the degree of overlap between
premises, as well as the assessment of additional indicators of task
difficulty, such as response times.
People’s responses to the and-elimination inferences 2.3 and
2.4 were coherent at levels above chance, when the materi-
als did not have the content that caused the conjunction fal-
lacy in Tversky and Kahneman (1983). This result is in line
with other findings in the probabilistic approach using different
methodologies (Pfeifer and Kleiter, 2005; Politzer and Baratgin,
under review). However, when the material did have the content
known to cause the fallacy, participants were incoherent, just
as Tversky and Kahneman would predict for our statements
group. Tversky and Kahneman did not predict whether the
fallacy would be found when p (or q) was explicitly inferred
from p and q as a premise. Stating a degree of confidence
in the conclusion of such an explicit inference could arguably
qualify as what they called a “transparent” problem, to which
people should give a coherent answer. Nevertheless, the partic-
ipants in our inference group were also incoherent by commit-
ting the conjunction fallacy, which at least reinforces Tversky
and Kahneman’s view of it as a deep fallacy that is hard to
overcome.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
With the advent of the Bayesian approach in the psychology of
reasoning, it has become possible to investigate people’s deductive
reasoning from uncertain premises, and to assess the extent to
which it is coherent. We investigated this topic in two experi-
ments using inferences between conjunctions, disjunctions, and
conditionals. We also looked at whether an explicit inference
task increases people’s coherence, and examined a number of
more specific hypotheses for the individual inferences. People’s
probability judgments were coherent at levels above chance for
almost all the inference forms investigated. The one exception was
when the materials for the and-elimination inference were of the
content known to cause the conjunction fallacy. The participants,
who read the standard description of Linda, were incoherent in
their judgments about “Linda is a feminist and a banker” and
“Linda is a banker,” even when they inferred the later statement
from the former in an explicit inference.
People were generally coherent, complying with the axioms of
probability theory, not only in the explicit inference task, but to an
equal extent when the task was to evaluate the single statements
that formed the inferences one at a time in random order. This
absence of an effect of task was not expected. On the one hand,
it does provide some support for the descriptive adequacy of the
principle of coherence, because it increases the generality of its
scope. It stands in accordance with findings on good conformity
to Bayesian principles in domains outside of reasoning, where
tasks are carried out in a more implicit way, like perception and
language comprehension (Fiser et al., 2010; Hsu et al., 2011). And
it suggests that addressing the question of what improves Bayesian
reasoning should not make us lose sight of the many contexts in
which conformity to Bayesian principles is already quite good.
On the other hand, it remains a plausible hypothesis that
explicit inference can be an effective use of cognitive resources to
improve coherence, to the benefit of reasoning and decision mak-
ing. The inference forms we considered here, for conjunctions,
disjunctions, and their relations to conditionals, may generally
be too simple for an effect to be found. Evans et al. (under
review) did find that an explicit inference task could increase
coherence in a study of MP, MT, AC, and DA. One possibility
is that these two-premise conditional inferences require a more
complex integration of premise probabilities, and people could
be helped to achieve this in explicit inference tasks.
Another possibility is that it was generally easier in the exper-
iment of Evans and et al. (under review) to detect an increase in
above chance coherence because the mean probability estimates
given to the premises in their experiment were generally higher
than in our experiments. Generally, the higher the probability of
the premises, the lower the chance rate of coherence and thus
the easier it becomes to detect above chance coherence when it
is there. This relation holds for MP, MT, AC, and DA, and all the
inferences investigated here except for the or-to-if inferences, 1.5–
1.6, in Experiment 1. For 1.5–1.6, the opposite relation holds: the
chance rate of coherence becomes lower, and the probability of
detecting above chance coherence larger, the lower the probability
assigned to the premise. Because the mean probability ratings
for the premises of the inferences in Experiment 1 was relatively
low, chance rate coherence was lower for 1.5 and 1.6 than for the
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other two inferences, 1.1–1.2 and 1.3–1.4. This explains the higher
ratings of above chance coherence for 1.5–1.6 compared to those
for if-to-or inferences, 1.3–1.4, in spite of comparable rates of
observed coherence for both inferences. This also explains why the
effect of above chance coherence was relatively small for 1.1–1.2
and 1.3–1.4 in spite of their sizeable rates of observed coherence.
Overall, the dependence of chance rate coherence on the prob-
abilities assigned to the premises is relevant for the interpretation
of the presence or absence of incremental effects of coherence,
predicted in this case by the presence of an inference task. But
it is also relevant to the interpretation of above chance coherence
taken by itself, as well as for the interpretation of differences in
above chance coherence between inferences. Future experiments
on these questions could therefore aim at more adequate control
of the premise probabilities, either by letting them be provided by
the experimenter, or by conducting a larger pre-test of materials
and selecting those with similar probabilities.
As noted above, the high coherence rates described for 1.5–1.6
or-to-if inferences, displayed in Figure 1, depend on the condi-
tional being interpreted as the conditional event. If the natural
language conditional corresponded to the material conditional,
with P(if p then q) = P(not-p or q) as implied by mental model
theory (Byrne and Johnson-Laird, 2009), then the responses to
1.5–1.6 would be incoherent at levels above chance. These results
provide strong evidence for the conditional event interpretation
of the conditional, and highlight the importance of taking into
account people’s semantic interpretation of the premises and con-
clusions for assessing how far they conform to Bayesian principles.
The results from Experiment 2 on the and-elimination infer-
ences 2.3 and 2.4 demonstrate that above chance coherence for
these forms depends on there being no conflict between the
probability of a statement and its contextual prototypicality. It
is remarkable how slight variations in these factors can lead to
incoherent judgments that resist even explicit inferences. It is a
challenge to all accounts of the conjunction fallacy to explain
why it persists through apparently “transparent” and-elimination
inferences. The very reliability of this finding highlights the rel-
evance of investigating further what is driving the conjunction
fallacy (see Jarvstad and Hahn, 2011; Oaksford, 2013; Pothos and
Busemeyer, 2013; Tentori et al., 2013, for a recent discussion).
However, it is more remarkable still that when such conflicts are
not present, people give generally coherent probability judgments
even in the absence of explicit inference tasks, at least for con-
junctions, disjunctions, and their relations to conditionals. This
provides further evidence of the descriptive adequacy of Bayesian
reasoning principles.
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